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Abstract
Since 2009, the European Union has faced the worst economic crisis of its history.
Due to the devastating impact of the Eurozone crisis on their economies, European
countries realized the need to deepen the integration. Without a fiscal union, the
Monetary Union would always be prone to economic crises. However, the efforts to
reinforce the Union’s economy have been hampered by the UK due to its obsession with
national sovereignty and lack of European ideals. In opposing further integration, the UK
officials have started to speak out about the probability of leaving the EU.
The purpose of this paper is to present benefits and challenges of Britain’s EU
membership and to assess the consequences of leaving the Union both for the UK and for
the EU. This study utilizes Power Transition theory to analyze British impact on
European integration. With the perspective of this theory, the UK is defined as a
dissatisfied partner. By applying the conflict-cooperation model of Brian Efird, Jacek
Kugler and Gaspare Genna, the effect of the UK’s dissatisfaction is empirically portrayed.
The	
  empirical	
  findings	
  of	
  the	
  conflict-‐	
  integration	
  model	
  clearly	
  show	
  that	
  
Britain’s	
  dissatisfaction	
  has	
  a	
  negative	
  impact	
  on	
  European	
  integration	
  and	
  
jeopardizes	
  the	
  future	
  of	
  the	
  Union.	
  Power	
  Transitions	
  analysis	
  indicates	
  that	
  the	
  UK	
  
would	
  become	
  an	
  insignificant	
  actor	
  in	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  and	
  lose	
  the	
  
opportunity	
  for	
  the	
  Union’s	
  leadership	
  if	
  it	
  leaves	
  the	
  EU.	
  	
  On	
  the	
  other	
  hand,	
  
although	
  Britain’s	
  departure	
  would	
  be	
  a	
  significant	
  loss	
  in	
  terms	
  of	
  capability,	
  
economic	
  coherence	
  is	
  more	
  important	
  for	
  the	
  EU.	
  Without	
  enough	
  commitment	
  for	
  

ii	
  
the	
  Union,	
  increasing	
  the	
  level	
  of	
  integration	
  with	
  the	
  UK	
  would	
  raise	
  the	
  probability	
  
of	
  conflict	
  with	
  the	
  integration	
  process	
  in	
  the	
  future.	
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Introduction
Britain has always been a dissatisfied partner in the Union, but it has never been
as close as it is now to relinquishing its membership. Due to the devastating Euro Crisis,
the European member states came to a state where further integration is the only suitable
option to prevent any future crisis and save the European Union. For this reason, there
have been concrete steps towards a fiscal union. However, for a country which has not
even become a member of the Monetary Union, due to issues of national sovereignty and
lack of European ideals, joining the fiscal union would be almost impossible. As a result,
Britain’s Prime Minister David Cameron announced the referendum option for British
citizens, which stated that they will be able to make the decision whether to stay or leave
the European Union.
Annoyed with Britain’s constant oppositions and reluctance since joining the
Community, other EU member states want Britain to make a decision, and refrain from
using depart from the EU as a bargaining tool. However, no one knows exactly what the
benefits and challenges would be for Britain and the EU if Britain leaves the EU, or if it
stays.
This paper analyzes the benefits and challenges of UK’s EU membership as well
as consequences of British withdrawal from the Union. By using the conflict- integration
model with Power Transitions perspective, this paper assesses the impact of Britain’s
dissatisfaction on European integration. For this purpose, this study is first going to
explain why Britain is a dissatisfied partner. Afterwards, the theoretical perspective of the
study is going to be put forth. Then, to be able to understand the current attitude of
Britain, a historical preview of the Britain-EU relationships will be presented. Later in the
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study, the benefits and costs of EU membership for both the UK and for the EU will be
depicted. In the analysis section, the adaptation of the conflict- integration formula will
be explained, and the empirical results will be discussed.
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Dissatisfied Partner
After winning the Second World War, Britain did not feel the need to integrate
itself with countries it had defeated or were occupied due to the hostilities of the war.
Though Britain has advanced quickly with the modern world, its citizens desire to
preserve the past greatness and traditions of their country. “As one former Conservative
MP, Sir Anthony Meyer, put it: ‘For France, Europe offers a chance to extend its
influence; for Britain, Europe is a damage-limitation exercise’” (Watts & Pilkington,
2005, p. 270). Due to its declining fortunes since 1945, Britain has not been able to
maintain the global position it once had. Many people admit that Britain’s influence on
the outcome of international events has significantly declined. However, people are still
unconvinced as to why Britain should embrace its continental partners (Watts &
Pilkington, 2005).
Strong attachment to national identity and national sovereignty influence the
attitudes of British citizens and leaders towards the EU. There is a tendency among
British citizens to see their norms, values, and national history as special and different
from other European nations. The vast majority of British leaders and lay people prefer
an intergovernmental EU, and are reluctant to create a federal Europe (Menéndez
Alarcón, 2004). Simon Bulmer (1992) points out numerous historical reasons why
sovereignty has had a strong importance for British policy:
[T]he continuity of institutions since the English Civil War; former world-power
status; the successful avoidance, as an island, of full-scale invasion; the position
of having ‘stood alone’ in 1940 together with the prestige gained as a victor; the
myth of parliamentary sovereignty; pride in national identity as an aversion to
‘homogenization’ by European social integration (arguably a variant of public
concerns about immigration); and perhaps even popular loyalty to the Crown (p.
8).
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Britain has never perceived the integration as a political process playing the great
ideals of European Union like the other large European Community member states. Aside
from Denmark, every member country had political needs that influenced its participation
in European integration, which consisted of three European Communities (EC) and the
foreign policy co-operation process (European Political Co-operation, EPC). West
Germany participated in the European integration to gain international credibility, obtain
sovereignty, sustain its new democracy, gain security, and to access to new markets in
Europe in the post-war period. For France, European integration was an opportunity to
end the repeated French-German hostilities. The integration offered benefits to Italy with
similar reasons related to West Germany. For Benelux countries, integration provided
security from strong continental neighbors. Integration was an escape for Ireland from the
boundaries of Britain. For Greece, Spain and Portugal, European integration was an
opportunity to be accepted to the West European family, and to support their democracies.
However, the importance of European integration for Britain was due to pragmatism
instead of principle (Bulmer, 1992).
Even though there was never a popular excitement about Britain joining the
European Community, changes in the international scene and the need to have access to
the large European market pushed Britain for accession. It was found advantageous for
Britain to apply to the EEC in 1961, only after it became obvious that Britain’s
international influence had become limited. Some British politicians started to believe
that Europe might serve Britain as a ground to increase its influence on events and
opinions in the world. Because neither the Commonwealth, nor its connection with the

5	
  
US was beneficial for Britain as it once had been, anymore. As Dean Acheson, a former
American Secretary of State worded in 1963: “Britain has lost an empire, but not yet
found a role” (Watts & Pilkington, 2005, p. 272). As a result, due to its obsession with
national sovereignty, Britain took the gatekeeper role in the EC to maintain control over
national positions and policies (Bulmer, 1992).
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Regional Integration Theories
Significant amount of international integration theories have been developed to
understand the European Union phenomenon. However, due to its complexity, none of
these integration theories have been able to explain altogether how European Union
advanced and what it is going to become. So far, theories of regional integration have
been more successful in explaining the development of the Union than where it will end
up. This paper neither aims to contribute to the theoretical explanations of the EU
integration, nor attempts to predict the final state of the Union. But to give an overview of
the regional integration theories to understand the integration phenomenon and the
reasons why countries go into integration.
Integration is a concept that has different connotations in social sciences. Some
scholars define integration as a political phenomenon and some others as an economic
phenomenon. For instance, Karl Deutsch perceives a community aspect from integration
as
the attainment, within a territory, of a “sense of community” and of institutions
and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a “long” time,
dependable expectations of “peaceful change” among its population. By sense of
community we mean a belief … that common social problems must and can be
resolved by processes of “peaceful change” (Deutsch, 1969, p. 5).
Differing from Karl Deutsch, Ernst Haas sees a political occurrence by defining
integration as
the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are
persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a
new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing
national states (Haas, 1968, p. 16).

7	
  
There are several core integration theories that attempt to explain the European
integration process: neofunctionalism, intergovernmentalism, liberal
intergovernmentalism and confederalism.
Neofunctionalism is a theory which focuses on the supranational institutions of
the EU. Even though neofunctionalism intended to formulate a general international
relations theory, which can explain regional integration processes, political and economic
integration of Europe became the core interest. Neofunctionalists ask how economic
integration leads to political integration; and at the end of this integration, what kind of
political unity will take place. Unlike realists, neofunctionalists do not see international
relations as a zero-sum game. When states are involved, economic integration will
strengthen all. Thus, political integration will come after (Strøby-Jensen, 2010). By
emphasizing the political agency in the integration process instead of technocratic
automaticity, neofunctionalism differs from David Mitrany’s functionalism. The
integration process is mainly backed by the determined actors who are driven by their
self-interests. Concentrating on the actors and their interactions, neofunctionalism
emphasizes a process in integration itself instead of outcomes. Additionally, the actors
seek their interests in a pluralist political environment (Rosamond, 2000).
According to Rosamond (2000), neofunctionalism has features of pluralist theory
in political science. Pluralist theory sees society as a combination of various interests of
many different groups. Diverse interests of different groups in the political structure
compete with each other to influence the governance for the outcomes of policies.
Furthermore, according to pluralism, elites are not the only influencers in society.
Consequently, the basis of politics is composed of group activity.
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According to the neofunctionalist logic, integration starts when two or more
countries agree to work together in an economic sector – let us say sector A. In order to
increase their efficiency, countries agree to establish a supranational structure to manage
common working. However, even though countries get some utility from their integration
in sector A, getting higher levels of benefits pushes countries to spread integration to the
connected sectors of A, such as sectors B and C. As a result, the integration in one sector
creates a functional force to extend integration to related sectors (Rosamond, 2000).
Once established, supranational institutions start to influence the integration
process. Supranational structure, which is the high authority, encourages the deepening of
integration between countries by increasing the number of sectors covered, and promotes
institutionalization at the regional level (Rosamond, 2000). Additionally, having their
own political agendas, supranational institutions suppress the interests of the member
states. For instance, in the European Parliament, representatives of the countries are
aligned according to party politics and ideology instead of national interests (StrøbyJensen, 2010).
Explaining the integration process, spillover is one of the most important concepts
of neofunctionalism. According to Ernst Haas (1968), spillover is the pressure for further
integration within an economic sector or in related sectors when integration once
generated in. Differing from Haas, Lindberg ascribes spillover a complementary
character. Spillover is the additional successive actions that have to be taken in order to
assure the initial goal (Lindberg, 1963). For instance, the core purpose might be free
movement of workers across EU borders. However, in order achieve that goal, countries
realize that different employment rules between them should be regularized first.
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Consequently, in order to establish free movement of labor between the member
countries, which is the main goal, additional political goals might be formulated to
prevail over the barriers (Strøby-Jensen, 2010). As a result, the logic of spillover relies on
expansion and deepening that more economic functions are pulled into the integration
process (Rosamond, 2000). Therefore, this perspective of the spillover is also called
‘functional spillover’. For example, establishing a customs union among some countries
might create the need for stable exchange rate parities. Therefore, establishing a customs
union can also bring exchange rate coordination between member states. Overall,
functional spillover is helpful to understand the transition from the ECSC to the
Economic and Monetary Union.
Loyalty transference, which can also be referred as elite socialization, is another
important component of neofunctionalist reasoning of integration. The elite socialization
argument of neofunctionalism claims that people who are involved in the supranational
level policy making process develop a tendency towards European loyalties and
inclinations. For example, members of the European Commission are expected to have a
European perspective rather than having national priorities (Rosamond, 2000). According
to Haas (1968), political integration consists of the transfer of loyalties, prospects, and
political actions of political actors to a new authority which has jurisdictional power over
the members of the previous nation states. Explaining the transition to a new form of
community, neofunctionalists put emphasis on elite loyalties instead of the mass public.
By using the loyalty aspect, neofunctionalists seek to explain the situations where
technocratic automaticity between governments is hindered by ideological elements. For
example, French president Charles de Gaulle’s nationalistic approach towards the EC
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system created hard times for neofunctionalists (Yeşilada & Wood, 2010). According to
the neofunctionalists, elite groups will develop loyalties towards the supranational
institutions with pan-European norms as European integration proceeds. In this way,
negotiations are going to be more technocratic rather than being politicized.
Consequently, coming to an agreement is easier by shifting towards more technical
problems in the integration agenda (Strøby-Jensen, 2010).
Besides the civil officials, the organized interest groups promote supranationalism.
According to neofunctionalist theory, as economic and political integration develops in a
region, interest groups will keep up with the development of the supranational institutions.
For instance, after the European Community was established, national industrial and
employers’ organizations established BUSINESSEUROPE, a common European
organization in 1958 (Rosamond, 2000). As actors involve in the integration process,
they generate political pressure for deeper integration. Because of the economic and
political integration, interest groups develop their own supranational interest. Therefore,
interest groups will force governments to speed up the integration process (Strøby-Jensen,
2010). Additionally, when there is anticipation about integration in significant economic
sectors, elites are expected to approve the idea for further integration (Rosamond, 2000).
According to Haas (1971), neofunctionalism has two major flaws. First, by
analyzing the decision-making mechanisms and societal features in pluralistic societies, it
is dubious to apply the neofunctionalism to the integration models other than European
integration. Second, by having a vague understanding of the integration conditions,
neofunctionalism has a dependent variable problem (Haas, 1971).
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After neofunctionalism, intergovernmentalism has become the core theory that
integration scholarship has applied to analyze EU. Intergovernmentalism is a state-centric
conceptual explanation of European Integration. While attributing to the interests and
actions of the nation-states in European integration, intergovernmentalism argues that
integration can only cover the areas which will not diminish state sovereignty. The
foundations of intergovernmentalism rely on the realist theory of international relations
(Cini, 2010). Realism assumes that states are the primary actors in the international arena.
Additionally, state behavior is the rational pursuit of self-interest (Morgenthau, 2006).
As stated by intergovernmentalism, integration is basically in the control of the
states. Therefore, intergovernmentalists are challenged by the question of why states
should create an establishment and transfer some of their policy sovereignty to it. As
state-centrism claims, EU integration is the result of the interest interaction between
states that is negotiated by EU institutions. For instance, the Council of Ministers is a
forum where national interests are interchanged and come to an understanding; there is an
intergovernmental mechanism in the EU system. Accordingly, state-centrists emphasize
intergovernmental bargains while defining integration (Rosamond, 2000).
Intergovernmentalism defines the European Union as cooperation instead of
integration. According to the intergovernmentalists, the behavior of the European
countries is simply a more institutionalized form of cooperation that seeks to overcome
policy issues. There is no ideology or idealism behind the aims of the European
countries; therefore, intergovernmentalists refuse that European Union is going to
become a political union (Cini, 2010).
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Intergovernmentalism does not reject that some functions are transferred from the
member states to the European institutions. For a more effective cooperation, in the
pursuit of their self-interest, countries pass some functions to the institutions. However,
intergovernmentalism does not attribute supranational features, such as independence and
autonomy to the European institutions. Therefore, the function of the European
institutions in contentious policy areas is limited (Cini, 2010).
The foundations of intergovernmentalism were built by Stanley Hoffman.
Hoffman criticized neofunctionalism because it was missing the setting within which
integration was processing. He highlighted that international politics continued to have
permanent conflicts about state interests. Additionally, cultural differences which
influence state interests are ignored by neofunctionalism (Hoffman, 1966).
According to Hoffman (1966), even though national sovereignty is domesticated,
the nation state is not taken over. Hoffman points out how resilient national states are in
the international arena by arguing that nation states are obstinate, not obsolete. State
governments have still been powerful because they have internal sovereignty in their
territories, and in being democratically elected, they gain political legitimacy (Hoffman,
1966).
Hoffman (1966) made a distinction between low politics and high politics in
integration. Integration at the level of high politics, issues related to national sovereignty
and national identity confronts more restraints than the integration at low political level,
which contains economic issues. Functional spillover might work at low politics, but it
cannot be assured that states are going to let integration occur at high politics (Hoffman,
1966).
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Another well-known regional integration theory is liberal intergovernmentalism.
According to liberal intergovernmentalism, the European Union governs economic
interdependence between member states by a coordinated policy bargain. The theory
highlights the power and the preferences of states. Liberal intergovernmentalism is based
on the rational actor model. States are assumed as rational actors, and they make use of
their evaluated preferences while achieving goals. Even though the representatives of the
member states have the responsibility to display domestic priorities, the decisions at the
EU level are taken by negotiation (Cini, 2010).
Liberal intergovernmentalism has two aspects for explaining the European
integration: demand for cooperation and supply of integration. In order to understand the
European integration, both the demand for cooperation, which is emerged from the
national polity, and the supply of integration, appearing from the inter-state negotiations,
have to be analyzed (Strøby-Jensen, 2010). Andrew Moravcsik (1992) argues that
societal factors give rise to integration because domestic interests shape state preferences,
which in turn affect state relations.
Moravcsik (1992) theorizes European integration as a two-level game by liberal
intergovernmentalism. Two-level game is the metaphor used to describe the connection
between domestic politics and international politics. Moravcsik’s two-level game is
composed of a liberal thesis of national preference formation and an intergovernmentalist
approach of bargaining between states. Liberal theory of national preferences, which is
the demand side of the integration, claims that national preferences of the member states
are shaped according to the circumstances of their domestic politics. However, classic
intergovernmentalism implies that national interests are determined according to where a
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state sees itself in the international system relatively. As claimed by Moravcsik,
competing political powers in the society determine national interests. Thus, what states
represent in the international arena are the interests of dominant groups within societies.
Therefore, in order to understand how states interact with each other, it is essential to
comprehend their domestic politics (Moravcsik, 1992).
Besides liberal intergovernmentalism, confederalism depicts the EU as a statecentric account. Confederalism is a certain type of intergovernmentalism in which states
preserve their sovereignty under an institutional body. According to confederalism,
Community is an example of the highest level of common subject matter in European
integration. This common matter is building larger markets to support joint interests of
member states, which join voluntarily. Confederalism is pursued by states for their
economic interests in the international system. Creating institutions is crucial for the life
and stability of the system (Rosamond, 2000).
In spite of their explanatory capacity, none of these theories help us analyze the
benefits and challenges of the UK’s EU membership as well as consequences of British
withdrawal from the Union, which is the research question of this paper. There are two
primary problems with these regional integration theories. First, aforementioned theories
attempt to explain integration process, however, they do not tell us anything about the
possible outcomes of the perspectives or the attitudes of the member states. Therefore, by
using these regional integration theories it is difficult to understand or estimate the
consequences of Britain’s attitude towards the European integration. Second, these
theories do not take into account the individual influence level of the member states to
integration process. These regional integration theories assume that each member state of
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a regional integration has the same capacity to influence the integration process. For
instance, both being the members of the EU, Malta and Britain does not have the same
capacity to influence the European integration process. For these reasons, this paper will
employ Power Transition theory as the theoretical perspective to analyze its research
question.
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Power Transition Theory
The analysis in this study is based on Power Transition theory, which was started
with A. F. K. Organski’s (1968) pioneering work. Power Transitions is a rationalist
theory which describes a hierarchical system. According to this theory, the distribution of
power in the international system is uneven. There is a dominant nation at the top of the
system that controls the largest proportion of resources in the system. However, the
dominant nation is not a hegemon. The dominant nation maintains its position by
dominating the potential rivals and by governing the international system in a way that
satisfies its allies. Below the dominant power, there are great powers in the power
pyramid, and below those there are middle powers and small powers respectively
(Organski, 1968). Power Transitions perspective tells us that currently, the United States
is the dominant power in the international power hierarchy. According to the same
perspective, at present, the great powers are China, Japan, Germany or the European
Union, and Russia. Power transition theory explains that great powers help maintain the
international system and allocates the resources. Among the great powers, a challenger to
the dominant power might rise. France, Brazil and Italy are middle powers. These nations
have significant power but are insufficient in challenging the dominant power for
international control (Tammen et al., 2000).
According to Power Transition theory, power defines the conditions of war and
peace in the international system. Power is defined as the ability to make opponents
comply with demands. Power is composed of three elements: population, economic
productivity (GDP) and the ability of the political system in extracting resources from
society. Population is an essential component of the power equation; however, in order to
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be relatively powerful, population must be more productive than the rivals. High political
capacity is the other requirement to be powerful or developed. Politically capable
governments can relatively extract more resources and utilize them for national goals
(Organski & Kugler, 1980).
The theory claims that war and peace decisions are made according to satisfaction
with the international rules or hierarchy. Dissatisfied nations will most likely challenge
the status quo; however, if these nations are not in power parity with the global or
regional dominant power, war will be less likely. At the great power level, conflict does
not occur frequently because most of these nations are satisfied with the rules of the
international system. Great powers of the hierarchy are most likely to be satisfied with
the international system because they are involved in the process of setting the rules with
the dominant power. The few nations at the top and many at the bottom are dissatisfied
with the international system because they are benefiting from the system less than their
expectations. These dissatisfied nations consider the international system as hostile and
dominated by the few. Their dissatisfaction might be related to historical reasons, such as
Germany prior to World Wars I and II, or by ideological reasons, like the Soviet Union.
For example, currently, China is considered as a dissatisfied country because of not being
fully integrated into the dominant nation’s regime. However, China’s dissatisfaction in
the future depends on its integration into international institutions and adoption of
international law. In being dissatisfied with the global status quo, dissatisfied nations
want to change the rules and norms of the international system. According to power
transition theory, jointly satisfied nations are most likely to cooperate. The security
alliance in NATO and economic integration in the European Union are examples. If the
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challenger is dissatisfied, the probability of war with the satisfied nations increases. A
Cold War is highly probable when the dissatisfied nation is not powerful enough to
challenge the dominant power. If nations are dissatisfied with the international system
because of same reasons, they might build an alliance against the status quo (Organski,
1968; Tammen et al., 2000). Consequently, Power Transition theory accounts both for
conflict and cooperation.
Power Transition defines the probability of war by formulizing the conditions of
parity and overtaking. The condition of parity occurs in the international hierarchy when
a challenger develops more than 80 percent of the resources of the dominant power.
When the challenger exceeds 20 percent of the resources of the dominant power, the
parity ends. The other concept that Power Transition theory introduces is the overtaking.
Overtaking happens when a challenger enters the steep growth section of the growth
track and catches a higher economic growth rate than the dominant nation. In order to
overtake the dominant nation, the challenger has to enter into parity with the dominant
nation by either increased productivity or by political capacity in relative terms. Parity
and overtaking increases the probability of conflict (Tammen et al., 2000). However,
parity and overtaking are not the direct cause of conflict. The conflict is highly related to
the dissatisfaction of the challenger with the status quo. The higher the determination of
the overtaking challenger, which is in parity, to change the international rules, the higher
the probability of conflict. The defender can prevent the conflict with the challenger by
incorporating its interests into the international system. In other words, by increasing the
satisfaction level of the challenger with the status quo, the probability of conflict can be
decreased. Conflict in World War I and II was the result of Germany’s overtaking the
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United Kingdom just prior to World War I and II. Likewise, Iran – Iraq conflict occurred
right after Iraq overtook Iran (Organski, 1968; Tammen et al., 2000; Kugler, Tammen, &
Efird, 2004).
Power Transition theory informs us about the timing of the wars. Wars between
great powers occur when their relative power is in parity. When there is a clearly superior
dominant power in the hierarchy, an attempt to challenge the dominant power will be less
likely. Therefore, disproportionate power will generate peace. When there is equality in
relative powers, the potential of conflict increases (Tammen et al., 2000; Lemke, 2002).
According to Douglas Lemke (2002), there are sub-systems within the overall
international power hierarchy. These sub-systems function similar to each other and to
the global power hierarchy. Lemke (2002) explains this series of parallel power
hierarchies in his multiple-hierarchy model, which is the theoretical revision of Power
Transition theory. The multiple-hierarchy model asserts that within the global power
pyramid there are smaller power pyramids that represent local/ regional systems or subhierarchies. As it can be seen in Figure I, the big block composed of USA, EU and China
represents the global hierarchy. The size of each block illustrates the power of the nation.
Inside the global hierarchy we see the regional hierarchies. Similar to the overall
international power hierarchy, each local/ regional hierarchy has a dominant power which
leads the local affairs and tries to preserve the status quo in the region. As the dominant
power in the global international system, the regional dominant power anticipates gains
from maintaining or building the status quo. As it is portrayed in Figure I, some nations
are dissatisfied with the global or regional hierarchy. Consequently, the multiple-
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hierarchy model argues that there are local hierarchies in South America, the Middle East,
the Far East and Africa (Lemke, 2002; Tammen et al., 2000).
Figure I: Global and regional hierarchies
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The expectations of the multiple-hierarchy model about peace and war in regional
systems are similar to the global hierarchy system. When the regional dominant power is
preponderant in the regional hierarchy, the probability of peace in the region is high.
However, when a local dissatisfied state rises to parity with the dominant state in the
local hierarchy, the probability of war increases in the regional system (Lemke, 2002).
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For example, when it is evaluated in terms the multiple hierarchy model, the South
American regional hierarchy is more stable than the Middle Eastern regional hierarchy.
Because in the South American regional hierarchy there is preponderance between the
local dominant power, Brazil and the great power, Argentina in terms of both GDP and
population. On the other hand, in the Middle Eastern regional hierarchy the dominant
power, Turkey and the great power, Iran are in parity. As in the global hierarchy, the
probability of war increases in the regional hierarchy when a dissatisfied local challenger
achieves parity with the local dominant power (Yeşilada, Efird, & Noordijk, 2006).
Lemke (2002) argues that regional hierarchies are not independent from the
interference of the dominant and great powers of the global system. When a dispute in a
local hierarchy affects the interests of the dominant power or a great power, there might
be interference from the global actors to a local hierarchy. Overt military intervention is
the most apparent interference of the great powers to local power hierarchies. However,
indirect interference is also possible, such as supporting one or another member of the
local hierarchy by providing economic or military resources, or by sharing intelligence.
Nevertheless, without the strong interest of the global great powers, the regional
hierarchies are expected to function in a way similar to the global power hierarchy. In the
absence of great power intervention, dissatisfaction with the local status quo and parity
between the local dominant power and a local challenger are expected to increase the
probability of war in that local hierarchy (Lemke, 2002).
When we look at the European Union from Power Transitions perspective, we see
countries on the cooperation side of the conflict-cooperation scale (Figure II). When we
look closer, it becomes visible that even though EU member countries are cooperating,
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the level of satisfaction differs between the members. Being more satisfied with the status
quo, some member countries are closer to the integration tip, which is the highest level of
cooperation, of the conflict-cooperation scale. These countries are the members of the
monetary union, and they are willing to deepen the integration with the banking union
after the Euro crisis. Countries like Britain, Sweden and Denmark are not as close to the
integration end of the conflict-cooperation scale as the Euro countries since they did not
give up their national currencies.
Figure II: Conflict – Cooperation Plane
!
!
Conflict

!

+('!

	
  

Cooperation
"#$%&'($)*#!

Compared to other EU countries the UK is a dissatisfied member in the
integration. According to Power Transitions, the dissatisfaction of the UK is significant
because being one of the powerful nations in the EU, Britain has the capacity to influence
the integration process. The higher the level of productivity and population of a country,
the more capacity it has to shape outcomes in a global or a regional status quo.
Consequently, due to its relative capability, the dissatisfaction of the UK is threatening
the integration process of the EU.
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A Historical Preview of the Britain- European Community Relationships
To be able to understand the dissatisfaction of Britain in the European Union
today, it is significant to review the vision of the country after the Second World War and
how the leaders of Britain perceived European integration since the establishment of the
European Community. According to Watts and Pilkington (2005), the British approach to
European policies since the Second World War has had two primary aspects:
• an emphasis upon the importance of Britain’s transatlantic ties as a central
tenet of foreign policy;
• a preference for intergovernmentalism over integrationalism – a belief in the
central role of national governments that renders any federalist notions as out
of the question for British ministers (p. 279).
Winston Churchill suggested a union to be established in Europe, however he
never envisioned Britain to be part of it. In a speech in 1946 in Zurich, Switzerland,
Winston Churchill emphasized the union of Europe by bringing Germany and France
together to prevent a third and atomic world war. Although Churchill’s Zurich speech
gave the impression that Britain was leading the growing European movement, his true
vision for Britain was laid in 1930:
We see nothing but good and hope in a richer, freer, more contented European
commonality. But we have our own dreams and our own task. We are with Europe
but not of it (Watts & Pilkington, 2005, pp. 8–9).
Churchill had a federalist view for Europe; however, his federalism did not see
Britain in that federation. According to Churchill, Britain had a unique position at the
intersection of an Atlantic Alliance, linking North America to Europe, and Europe itself
and the British Commonwealth. Churchill shared the smugness of the British people who
believed in the greatness of Britain which won the war (Watts & Pilkington, 2005). As
stated by this view, “Britain was a global power, and only incidentally a European power”
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(George, 1998, p. 39). The policies of the major Departments of State, the Treasury and
the Foreign Office were formulated according to this globalist view. The British people
could understand why uniting would help the devastated continental European countries;
however, they did not see Britain as a member of the band. As a result of that view, being
one of the three world powers besides the USA and Soviet Union, Britain did not need
Europe (George, 1998; Watts & Pilkington, 2005). This sentiment was expressed by
people who had power and influence in Britain that, “Europe had been fatally damaged
by the war and that Britain should avoid chaining itself to a corpse” (Watts & Pilkington,
2005, p. 9).
In 1940s the attitude of Britain towards European integration was mostly rejection
and counter-measures, and this attitude can still be observed today. There are three events
in 1940s that exemplify typical British response to European unification. First, in 1947
Britain blocked the negotiations that planned to widen the customs union in Europe,
which was already established between Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg with
the Benelux Agreement. Since a customs union should have a supervisory council, or a
supranational assembly, British ministers were concerned that Britain’s sovereignty
would diminish. Second, after signing the treaty of Brussels in 1948 between Britain,
France, and Benelux countries against the Soviet expansionism, signatories wanted to
further the defense agreement and establish the Western European Union (WEU) by
creating a unified defense policy and military alliance among non-communist European
states. Due to the consideration of economic and political co-operation, the establishment
of an assembly or a parliament as a governing body came up as an idea. However, Britain
acted against the idea of pooling some degree of authority to govern the WEU. British
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foreign secretary of the post-war Attlee government Ernest Bevin expressed that the
community was established for defense purposes only. As a result, instead of an assembly
or a parliament, a Consultative Permanent Council was established. Lastly, when the
Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) was established to
administer the European Recovery Program (ERP) under the Marshall Aid, due to the
economic success of the organization in Europe, European federalists wanted to equip
OEEC with an executive decision which made the capability to form a European
administrative institution. The European enthusiasts wanted to create an institution which
would become the force of European integration. They even chose a candidate, the
Belgian Paul-Henri Spaak, for this purpose. However, the Foreign Office of Britain
disagreed with establishing a supranational governing structure for the OEEC and vetoed
the nomination of Spaak as chairman of the organization. Instead, Britain supported
Oliver Franks, who was an anti-federalist from Whitehall (Gowland & Turner, 2000;
Greenwood, 1996; Watts & Pilkington, 2005).
In seeing Britain as a world power, Europe was not a priority for the Attlee
government. The Attlee government declined to participate when the negotiations of the
European Coal and Steel Community started in 1950 (George, 1998). According to
Duncan Watts and Colin Pilkington (2005), Britain refused to join the negotiations for the
Coal and Steel Community in 1950 because both Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet
made it clear that besides the economic benefits, the primary purpose was to set the stage
for a political union. In June 1950, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Stafford Cripps,
expressed the ministerial attitude towards establishing a European federation starting with
the Coal and Steel Community:
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In our view, participation in a political federation, limited to Western Europe, is
not compatible either with our Commonwealth ties, our obligations as a member
of the wider Atlantic community or as a World Power (Watts & Pilkington, 2005,
p. 16)
Once there was an agreement on the European Economic Community (EEC), the
British tried to attract the members of the EEC to join a customs-free trade in industrial
goods. All the seventeen members of the OEEC would be able to join this free trade area.
Britain’s counter-plan was aimed to establish a low-tariff common market but to avoid
political or integrationist implications. In 1959, the UK, Portugal, Norway, Sweden,
Denmark, Austria and Switzerland established the European Free Trade Area (EFTA),
which was a loose free trade association and intergovernmental in character. Unlike the
EEC, EFTA was not aimed to unite European peoples. As a result, with the leadership of
Britain, a rival body was created against the EEC (Gowland & Turner, 2000; Watts &
Pilkington, 2005).
EFTA came into force in 1960, but it did not take so long for the British
government to seek membership of the EEC. There were four major reasons why the
Macmillan government started to contemplate to join the Six (Belgium, France, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany) in 1961. First, Britain started to
realize after the Suez affair in 1956 that it was not a world power anymore. It was
identified that Britain needed to find a new world role, therefore, many people pointed
out Europe. Second, even though in the 1950s and 1960s the British economy was
booming, the economic development of the EEC members, which had almost doubled
their living standards in the same time period, made membership appealing. Third,
joining together for the first time since the Napoleonic epoch, Britain did not want to
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confront a Europe without any British input. Watching the development of political and
economic institutions that function as barriers for outsiders, Britain did not want to be
excluded from shaping the European policy and the European market. Lastly, it became
clear that the United States viewed EFTA as creating complications in Europe. If one day
the Six were to be developed into a Federal State, the United States of Europe may
become more important for the US than the UK. Due to the risk of losing its links with
the US, Britain decided to apply for EEC membership (George, 1998; Greenwood, 1996;
Watts & Pilkington, 2005).
In January 1963 President de Gaulle announced the unilateral French veto on
British membership. The French President indicated his primary reason as Britain had not
accepted a European vocation yet, and expressed his doubts: “England in fact is insular,
maritime, bound by her trade, her markets, her supplies, to countries that are very diverse
and often very far away... How can England, as she lives, as she produces, as she trades,
be incorporated in the Common Market?” (George, 1998, p. 34). On the other hand,
Watts and Pilkington points out another reason for de Gaulle’s veto. According to De
Gaulle, having failed from the outside, Britain applied for membership to ruin the EEC
from the inside. When the Britain- EEC talks were stuck due to Britain’s protectionism
for its trade links with the Commonwealth, De Gaulle interpreted the situation as
Britain’s attempt to destroy the agricultural policy of the EEC. As a result, De Gaulle
exercised his veto to prevent the British joining the EEC (2005).
Even though De Gaulle became the target for critiques after vetoing the first
British bid, many believed that Britain’s attitude and hesitations played significant roles
in the failure of the first application. Throughout the negotiations Britain gave the
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impression that by applying to the Community, they were doing a favor for Europe.
Watts and Pilkington quotes a political commentator in their study: “It was in many
respects as if Britain had decided that the EEC was worthy of British membership, and
not the way around” (2005, p. 26). This attitude of Britain has been present in its
relationships with Europe ever since, and will be seen clearly between Margaret Thatcher
and the EC. Furthermore, Britain was hesitant about the membership due to the terms of
entry. Britain demanded more and more compromises for the Commonwealth, EFTA and
for British farmers. Even according to one study, before submitting the formal application,
British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan knew that De Gaulle was going to hinder the
British accession (Watts & Pilkington, 2005).
Being blocked by de Gaulle for the second time, membership negotiations for
Britain started only after the French President resigned from office. After refusing to
accept Britain’s second application, in 1967 de Gaulle announced that Britain was still
not ready to become a member of the European Community (after a merger took place in
1965). Once Georges Pompidou became the new French President in 1969, the French
opposition for British membership ended. Pompidou did not have any deep-rooted demur
for British membership like his predecessor. Consequently, negotiations went smoothly
and Britain signed the Treaty of Accession in Brussels on January 1st 1972 (George,
1998).
Even during its third application, there were not any changes on the British
perspective towards the European Community. Instead of having any European ideals,
both Macmillan and Wilson Administrations pursued membership of the Communities to
be able to direct how Europe ought to be linked to the world system. During British
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applications “[t]here was no conversion to the ideal of European union that was espoused
by the leaders of the founder states; there was no attempt to sell the idea of British
membership in anything other than pragmatic terms to the British electorate; there was no
abandonment at either official or popular level of a commitment to a strong sense of
national identity, which remained the basis for the electoral appeals of politicians in all
parties; there was no abandonment of the attachment of the special relationship with the
United States, or of the commitment at both official and popular levels to the Atlantic
Alliance as the basis of international stability” (George, 1998, p. 40).
All these subjects would continue to affect Britain’s relationship with the EC after
1970. Failing to embrace the ideal of European Union, disagreements continued to arise
with the other member states. The approach of the British statesmen and women
continued to be influenced by the electorate that disliked the EC. Due to the strong sense
of national identity, the British representatives have had difficulty putting the interests of
Europe before Britain in the Council of Ministers of the EC, where clashes have occurred.
Mostly, EC’s relationship with the United States and EC’s relationship with the global
order have been the issues of conflict with the Community. Therefore, Britain has many
times been regarded as either the US Trojan Horse or the awkward partner in the
Community (George, 1998).
Margaret Thatcher also followed the view of British superiority to Europe in her
governance. Re-negotiating Britain’s contribution to the European budget fiercely from
1979 to 1984, her behavior was strongly disapproved by the other EC members. At one
point the French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac even called for Britain’s dismissal from
the EC. She:
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• despised committees;
• was very reluctant to agree to any compromise or consensus;
• would not, without a real struggle, do any deal which detracted from her
demands;
• believed in her own judgment – her position in any argument was that she was
right and everyone else was wrong (Watts & Pilkington, 2005, p. 32).
After five years of insisting on her terms, Thatcher gained more than reasonable.
However, the cost was damaged future Britain – Europe relations. “The insistent
demands made by Thatcher, and her domineering and insulting treatment [for] her
supposed partners, had at times almost turned Britain into a pariah in European circles”
(Watts & Pilkington, 2005, p. 35).
Britain played an obstructive role when the European integration attempted to
progress with the EMU. Jacques Delors proposed a three-step pathway for EMU, which
coordinated economic policies between the EC countries within the ERM; established an
independent European Central Bank (ECB); and to use a single European currency.
Margaret Thatcher signed the agreement to join the ERM only because the foreign
secretary Geoffrey Howe and the Chancellor of the Exchequer Nigel Lawson from her
cabinet threatened to resign if she did not sign the agreement. Besides, she signed the
agreement with preconditions: “Internal market arrangements must be completed; All
exchange controls should be abolished; There should be a free and open market in
financial services; There must be a strengthening of competition policy” (Watts &
Pilkington, 2005, p. 46). Later on, for the other steps of the Delors Plan, the British prime
minister voted down three times in intergovernmental conferences. Only after calling a
simple majority vote on stage under the presidency of Italian Prime Minister Bettino
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Craxi, European leaders were able to vote against Thatcher. Britain found herself isolated
against eleven (George, 1998; Greenwood, 1996; Watts & Pilkington, 2005).
The legacy of Thatcher even constrained the maneuver of her successor John
Major during his premiership. Due to the opposition of the eurosceptics from the Tory
bank benches, John Major became as opposed to the European integration as his
predecessor. The pamphlet which was published by the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office during Britain’s EC presidency in 1992 indicates Britain’s anti-integrationist
vision:
The original Community treaties aimed at an ‘ever-closer-union among the
peoples of Europe’. The government are committed to closer co-operation with
our Community partners. This has brought political and economic benefits. But
the Government don’t want, and won’t have, a United States of Europe (Watts &
Pilkington, 2005, p. 118).
Using the terminology of European federalism and Christian Democracy, British
aimed to limit the extent of interventions by the Commission to national affairs. During
the Maastricht debates under the British presidency in 1992, the British Prime Minister
John Major promoted subsidiarity (George, 1998; Gowland & Turner, 2000). Subsidiarity
meant that:
• proposals by the centre in Brussels should be implemented according to the
decisions of national or regional government;
• no major policy decision should be made in Brussels if it is more properly the
concern of national or regional government (Watts & Pilkington, 2005, p. 51).
John Major broke the unwritten rules of the EU by using the veto weapon for party
politics. When Chancellor Kohl of Germany and President Mitterrand of France agreed to
support Jean-Luc Dehaene, the prime minister of Belgium, as the new president of the
Commission in 1994, John Major stated that he might only settle for the Dutch prime
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minister Ruud Lubbers if he could not have the British commissioner as the president.
The British stressed that due to the secret deal between Kohl and Mitterrand supporting
Jean-Luc Dehaene for the presidency, the British veto would be used to prevent the
Belgian. Britain’s reaction was interpreted as Major’s attempt to give an impression to
the eurosceptics in his party that he had a tough and firm stance on the European issues.
Later on, instead of voting against Dehaene, the British prime minister held his threat and
employed the veto. Consequently, using the ultimate weapon of veto for party political
purposes was a significant moment for the Britain- EU relations. John Major ignored the
unwritten rules of the EU (Watts & Pilkington, 2005).
When there was progress towards EMU at Maastricht, Major government’s
approach was wait-and-see. Under EMU it planned to create three institutions: the
European Central Bank (ECB), the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), and a
common currency. However, among all the integrationist steps, eurosceptics were most
suspicious of the EMU institutions. Britain refused to commit itself to a target date to join
the single currency for several reasons. First, it was difficult to estimate when the British
economic cycle and the other EU economies were going to converge enough. Second,
there was uncertainty about how much time was needed to complete the economic and
political prerequisites. Third, the government did not want to make a decision until there
was sufficient information about the functioning and the impact of euro. Therefore, the
government implemented a policy that a judgment on entry would be made if the euro
became successful or not, and if the five economic tests of the Chancellor, Gordon Brown
were satisfied (Gowland & Turner, 2000; Watts & Pilkington, 2005). Brown’s five
economic tests for the adoption of single currency were the following questions:
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Would it help to create jobs? Would it promote investment in the UK? Would it be
of assistance to the City and the financial services sector? Was the EU economy
strong and flexible enough to withstand any shocks that might arise if there was a
single currency? Was the British business cycle in harmony with those of other
member states? (Gowland & Turner, 2000, p. 349).
Lastly, senior ministers were aware of the political risks of giving an unambiguous
commitment to join the single currency area (Gowland & Turner, 2000).
After Labour’s 1997 victory, Tony Blair signaled that the UK government was
going to be less obstructionist in the EU compared to the former governments; however,
Blair government also became defensive on issues of further integration. When Tony
Blair came to power, he gave the message that he would like Britain to take a
constructive role in Europe. His government gave the hint that instead of confrontation,
they are willing to negotiate and readily compromise. However, when German finance
minister, Oskar Lafontaine, outlined proposals for tax harmonization, Blair government
got defensive. The British tabloid press was fiercely against such European initiatives.
Due to the hostility pumped by the media, ministers took a more anti-European stance.
Tony Blair and chancellor Gordon Brown stated that they would veto any harmonize or
expand in European taxation. As a result, Tony Blair avoided majority voting on direct
taxation and social security during the Nice Summit in 2000 (Watts & Pilkington, 2005).
After the European debt crisis, the attitude of the UK hampered the process of
taking necessary precautions. At the European Summit of January 2012, except the Czech
Republic and the UK, EU member states agreed on a fiscal treaty which will enforce
budget discipline. A binding treaty that enforced budget rules was particularly important
for Germany, which is the Eurozone’s most powerful economy and the biggest lender.
The purpose of the German leadership was to prevent the accumulation of excessive
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debts by closer co-ordination of budget policy across the EU. By monitoring compliance
and imposing fines on rule-breakers, the fiscal treaty empowers the European Court of
Justice. Additionally, scrutinizing national budgets, the treaty enhances the role of the
European Commission. However, the UK Prime Minister David Cameron rejected the
deal claiming that proposals for financial service regulations would affect the City of
London. As a result, by prioritizing Britain’s interests over every European matter,
Cameron disregarded taking necessary fiscal measures to prevent any future crisis that
would especially make the Eurozone countries suffer (“EU summit: UK and Czechs
refuse to join fiscal compact,” 2012, “Q&A: EU fiscal treaty to control eurozone budgets,”
2012; Nielsen, 2012).
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Benefits & Costs
The costs of EU membership are another dimension of Britain’s dissatisfaction.
The costs of EU membership that have become controversial for Britain contain the
common agricultural and fisheries policies, EU-wide regional funds, contributions to the
EU budget, and the implementation of EU social and employment regulations at the UK
economy. Deepening of political integration in the form of qualified majority voting,
European Court of Justice jurisdiction and the increased powers of the European
Parliament caused the shift of more democratic control to Brussels. On the other hand, if
Britain leaves the EU, there would be significant costs of leaving the membership in
terms of trade, foreign direct investment, international negotiations and other non-trade
factors. Consequently, this section of the paper presents the current cost-benefit analysis
in the literature aiming to understand economic and political impacts if Britain leaves the
EU both from the perspectives of the UK and the EU.
UK’s Trade with the EU
According to Stephen Booth and Christopher Howarth (2012), the EU and
especially the eurozone continue to be the most important trade market for the UK. First
of all, the EU accounts for a significant amount of the UK’s trade. 47.5% of the UK’s
total goods and services exports is with the EU (Brocklehurst et al., 2012). Being a
member of the EU, Britain enjoys the tariff free single market. With the enlargement of
the EU, the UK has been able to benefit from the expanded internal market. Additionally,
due to the Europe-wide standards of the Single Market, UK firms must comply with only
one set of specifications. Complying with a single set of regulations decreases the costs
of the firms (Booth & Howarth, 2012).
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Graph I: UK’s trade in goods & services 2011
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Booth and Howarth (2012) point out four important facts that need to be taken
into account in Britain’s trade with the EU. First, the Rotterdam-Antwerp Effect causes
distortions to the UK’s goods and services exports to the EU. Rotterdam in the
Netherlands and Antwerp in Belgium are two substantial ports in the world that handle
large amounts of exports coming from Britain. Some of the British exports are consumed
in Belgium and Netherlands; however, some of them are continued to be shipped by road
and rail to other EU countries, and some of these exports are shipped onwards to other
continents by cargo vessels. In other words, even if the British exports are shipped to the
Netherlands and Belgium, some of these exports are transshipped to other EU countries
and other continents from the ports of Rotterdam and Antwerp without even touching
Dutch or Belgian soil. As a result, compiling the geographical export registers by the
British Office for National Statistics, the Rotterdam-Antwerp Effect occurs due to
recording the first port of the discharge of consignment as the geographical destination of
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the export even though that is not the end-destination country for the consignment (“The
Rotterdam-Antwerp Effect & the Netherlands Distortion,” 2011).
Second, due to the Netherlands Distortion, all earnings in the UK from FDI
coming from the EU are overstated. Global Britain Briefing Note explains the
Netherlands Distortion:
For tax reasons, FDI is often channeled through intermediate holding companies
domiciled in the Netherlands. In collecting statistics on FDI involving the UK, the
Office for National Statistics (ONS), ... records such FDI as originating in or
going to the Netherlands, rather than the country of ultimate origin or the country
which is the end-destination of the FDI. The resulting Netherlands Distortion
affects geographical analyses not just of FDI flows, but of the income or earnings
(in the form of profits, dividends, interest and management fees) associated with
them (“Foreign Direct Investment: The Netherlands Distortion,” 2004; p. 2).
The Rotterdam-Antwerp Effect and the Netherlands Distortion can be
demonstrated by a simple calculation using the current account data. The impact of both
the Rotterdam-Antwerp Effect and the Netherlands Distortion can be seen in current
account credits because it is formed of export of goods, export of services, income and
current transfers. As the size of these distortions can be seen at Table I, a Dutch person is
consuming British imports approximately five times more than a German or a French
person; a Belgian person consumes about three times more than a German or a French
person; and a Luxembourger consumes more than 50 times. According to on the ground
observation, the per-capita consumption of British imports is mainly the same in
Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. Therefore, compared to
Germany and France, the excess consumption of the British imports in the Netherlands,
Belgium and Luxembourg embody the Rotterdam-Antwerp Effect and the Netherlands
Distortion (“The Rotterdam-Antwerp Effect & the Netherlands Distortion,” 2011).
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Table I: The Rotterdam-Antwerp Effect & The Netherlands Distortion
Germany
France Netherlands Belgium
A: 2011 Current
52914
42435
51427
22404
1
account credits
(£ million)
B: 2011 Population2 81.7
65.4
16.7
11.0
(million)
A/B UK current
647.5
648.5
3080.2
2035.2
account per capita
(£)

Luxembourg
17710
0.5
34255.3

1: Source: ONS Correction The Pink Book 2012
2: Source: World Bank World Development Indicators

If the per capita consumption of British imports is roughly the same in Germany,
France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, the accurate amount of British
imports consumed by Dutch, Belgian and Luxembourger people can be calculated.
Similarity in the per capita consumption, it can be assumed that the average value of
German and French per capita imported British goods, services and income
[(647.5+648.5)/2= 648] is the same for a Dutch, a Belgian and a Luxembourger. By using
the average per capita consumption in Germany and France, the current account credits
coming to Britain from the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg can be calculated.
Table II: The UK Current Account: real versus officially recorded in 2011
£ million
Real*
Official
Excess
To Netherlands
10819
51427
40608
To Belgium
7133
22404
15271
To Luxembourg
335
17710
17375
Total
18286
91541
73255
* assuming per capita imports of British goods, services & income in each
country is £ 648

Since the excess amount is not totally coming from the other EU countries but
also from the non-EU countries that are transshipped from Rotterdam and Antwerp, it can
be assumed that only half of the total current account excess amount (£73 billion) comes
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from EU countries. According to this assumption, there is approximately £37 billion
excess amount in the current accounts that are recorded as originating from EU countries,
but actually originated from non-EU countries. As a result, the total amount of the current
account credits of Britain from the world will not change. However, the share of credits
from EU countries has decreased from 44.5% to 39.2%. Furthermore, 37 billion £ excess
amount accounted for the EU means that Britain’s Office for National Statistics displays
the 2011 current account credits of the EU in Correction The Pink Book 2012 11.8%
more.
For the third fact about Britain’s trade with the EU, Booth and Howarth (2012)
point out that Britain is less dependent on the EU for trade than other EU countries. Even
though the EU and the Eurozone are the largest markets for Britain’s trade (Graph I), the
UK is less reliant on the EU than the most of the other members in terms of trade (Booth
& Howarth, 2012). As seen from Graph II, the UK is at the low end of the chart with
countries whose intra-EU trade has a small share in their total goods exports. Malta and
Greece’s exports to the EU in their total exports are 34.4% and 40.6% respectively. The
UK is following these two with 47.8% share of EU goods exports. On the other hand,
countries like Luxembourg, Czech Republic and Slovakia export around 80% of their
total exports to the EU. The farther to the right hand side of the chart, the more dependent
the member countries are to the EU market.
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Graph II: Share of the merchandise exports to the EU in total exports (%) - 2012
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The price of leaving the Single Market for the UK today is much smaller than the
time when it joined the union in 1973. The tariff barriers all over the world have been
decreasing due to the negotiations of GATT and its successor WTO (“Britain and
Europe: Making the Break,” 2012). EU tariff rates have followed the global trend as it
can be seen from Graph III (Booth & Howarth, 2012). “If import tariffs are weighted by
the volume of trade in each product, the average faced by exporters from outside the EU
into the [S]ingle [M]arket has fallen to around 3%” (“Britain and Europe: Making the
Break,” 2012, par. 20). This much of a cost increase is normal for exporters due to the
rise in oil prices and sudden changes in the exchange rates. However, in certain areas,
such as agriculture, automotive, and textiles, EU tariffs are comparatively high (Booth &
Howarth, 2012).
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Graph III: EU’s average MFN tariff rates in all products (%)
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In industries such as food and textiles, the impact of leaving the Single Market
would be harder for the UK. British dairy exports would be exposed to an import tax of
55% and tariff rates higher than 200% for certain items. For instance, cheddar cheese
would incur a tariff of €167 per 100kg and for Stilton the overhead would be €141. As it
can be seen at Graph IV, the average MFN tariff rate for dairy products is 32.6%. In
clothing the average tariffs would increase the price of British exports up to 12% in
European markets. Furthermore, for non-agricultural products such as motor vehicles and
fish, the EU tariff rates can be as high as 22% and 22-26% relatively (“Britain and
Europe: Making the Break,” 2012; WTO Secretariat, 2011).
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In a scenario of leaving the EU, Britain’s car industry would be negatively
influenced. First of all, British car exports to EU countries would be facing an average of
10% ad valorem MFN duties (Graph IV). Moreover, there would be a tariff rate of 4% on
the car equipments entering the EU market, and there would be pressure in Britain to
apply tariffs on parts imported from the EU. Particularly, plants and supply chains of car
producers in other EU countries would be under high risk. When car components leave
the continent, their passing might be blocked or delayed (“Britain and Europe: Making
the Break,” 2012).
Aerospace is another industry which requires uninterrupted trade with the
continent. Being the world’s largest industry outside the US, if Britain walks away from
the EU, France will take its place. It will take some time to produce high-tech materials
such as carbon fiber wing spars in different places. However, the production of basic
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components, like metal brackets, can easily be replicated elsewhere. To keep their supply
chains simple, large manufacturers, such as Airbus might support new suppliers in the
EU to evade customs barriers (“Britain and Europe: Making the Break,” 2012).
Lastly, Booth and Howarth (2012) highlight the significance of the services sector
for the UK. As it can be seen from Graph V, the services sector has a positive impact on
the UK trade balance while trade in goods increases the deficit of the balance of
payments. Especially, financial services have the largest share in UK’s services exports.
According to the ONS in Correction The Pink Book 2012, 50.6% of the surplus in the
services trade is due to the financial services (Brocklehurst et al., 2012). As it can be seen
from Graph VI, the UK is the second most benefiting country from financial transactions
in the world after the US. In 2011 the net balance of the US and the UK from financial
transactions were 42 and 38 billion Euros respectively, while the closest country to these
two was Luxembourg with only 15 billion Euros.
Graph V: UK’s trade balance in goods and services 1970-2011 (bn £)
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Graph VI: 2011 International transactions in financial services: balance (bn €)
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Due to the limited liberalization of the services trade in the EU Single Market, the
UK has not been able to benefit enough from the market even though the services sector
is its strong suit. According to the National Accounts data of Eurostat (2013), services
have the highest contribution to the EU-27’s total gross value added. The share of
services in the EU-27’s total gross value added raised from 70.2% in 2001 to 72.5% in
2011. Especially in Cyprus, Malta, France (2010 data), Greece, Belgium, Denmark and
the United Kingdom, services consisted more than three quarters of their total value
added (“National accounts – GDP,” 2013). As it can be seen at Graph VII, the EU is the
biggest trade destination for UK services exports. However, UK’s level of services export
to the EU-27 is much below the level of goods exports (Graph VIII). UK’s services
export to the rest of the world is increasing faster than its services export to the EU-27.
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Graph VII: UK’s services exports by destination 2011 (bn £)
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Graph VIII: UK exports: EU vs. rest of the world
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If Britain leaves the EU, the business investment on finance would drift away to
the continent. Today, the financiers of the rising economic powers of Asia and Latin
America are more interested in the European market than the American banks that were
interested in London due to the loose regulations in the 1950s and 1960s (“Britain and
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Europe: Making the Break,” 2012). According to the report of TheCityUK, the analysis
of 147 location decisions of financial services firms between 2006 and 2012 indicate that
40% of the decision makers mentioned the European Union as the main reason for
choosing Britain (“Amber warning,” 2012). Even though trade liberalization in financial
services is limited in the Single Market, banks, investment and insurance companies
based in the UK have the ability to set up branches or make service available all around
the EEA. Therefore, keeping its position as the primary center for sorting out cash trades
and derivatives in euros is the only way for London to become a regional hub, and trade
China’s currency (“Britain and Europe: Making the Break,” 2012).
Foreign Direct Investment Received by the UK
It is difficult to assess the amount of inward investment the UK is attracting
because of its EU membership. Due to various reasons, such as the English language,
infrastructure, laws, innovation, and being in the Single Market, the UK has been able to
attract significant amounts of inward investment. As it is indicated in Graph IX, after the
Single European Act (1986) and the Maastricht Treaty (1993) the flow of investment into
the UK increased. However, when the FDI inflow of the UK is compared with the US
and the EU’s total, we see similar trends. Therefore, some of the increase in the UK’s
FDI is not totally related to its EU membership, but also to global factors, like the ‘dotcom bubble’. In spite of the global factors, some sectors, such as the car industry, have
overseas investments in the UK, primarily due to the Single Market (Booth & Howarth,
2012). Therefore, if Britain leaves the EU, Japanese carmakers would be hurt because
most of their British production is sold in the EU market (“Britain and Europe: Making
the Break,” 2012).
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Graph IX: Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP)
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If Britain leaves the EU, the British car industry, which is the engine of its
economy, is going to suffer a blow. Paul Haydon points out that despite the impact of the
European financial crises, there is rapid growth in output and productivity in the British
car industry (2013). In 2012, Britain exported more cars than it imported since 1976. In
the first quarter of 2012, the trade surplus in cars increased the total goods export of the
UK by 5.8%, making it £26.4 billion (Rowley, 2012). By offsetting Britain’s large trade
deficit and accounting for 11% of its manufactured exports, the automotive industry is
vital for the British economy. The performance of the British car industry is not only
resisting the relative economic decline but also reinstating the Britain’s position as a
global manufacturing hub. According to Haydon (2013), increase in foreign direct
investment, international trade and innovation are the main reasons of the revival of the
British car industry. Britain’s EU membership is crucial for each of these factors. The
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British automotive industry received nearly £6 billion in foreign direct investment over
the last two years. “This investment has been primarily motivated by the UK’s position as
a [launch pad] into the highly regulated EU market” (Haydon, 2013, para. 3). Even the
EU-South Korea trade agreement, which was signed in 2012, increased the vehicle
exports from the UK by 8%. The recent trade agreement with Singapore is also expected
to increase British car exports. If Britain leaves the Single Market, car makers such as
Nissan, Ford and BMW would shift their investments to more secure EU countries like
Poland or the Czech Republic. Unrestricted access to the Single Market would be highly
unlikely even if the British government renegotiates a unilateral free trade agreement
with the EU. As result, accompanying uncertainty would make the investors look for
alternative countries (“Britain and Europe: Making the Break,” 2012; Haydon, 2013;
Wheeler & Peter, 2013).
Negotiation Power of the EU
According to Booth and Howarth (2012), with the combined economic capacity
of its members, the weight of the EU can function as leverage for the interests of the UK
in international trade talks. Uniting all of its members, the EU is world’s largest economy
and trading block with a total population of over 500 million. The EU holds nearly 29 %
of global output, 15 % of global merchandise exports (2011) and 25 % of global
commercial services exports (2011) (“Trade Profiles: European Union (27),” 2012).
Having such a large domestic market gives a negotiation advantage to the EU since it has
the ability to hold back or revoke the access of its trading partners. As a result, having the
ability to influence global trade talks, the EU market clout can be a means to further the
UK’s interests in global trade talks (Booth & Howarth, 2012).
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The EU has been able to use its weight during the negotiations with the US and
China, which would be very difficult for the UK alone. For instance, due to the EU
support, after a series of talks, EU companies doing business in China gained protection
of their intellectual property rights. The EU also negotiated for EU companies to have
access to the public procurement system of China. Other examples are the negotiations
between the EU and the US on air travel and steel tariffs. The combined weight of the EU
most likely helped in all these negotiations to be better off in outcomes that would be
difficult for the UK to obtain alone (Booth & Howarth, 2012).
On the other hand, due to the aggregation of all the member states’ national
interests, the EU can act against the interests of the UK in certain issues. For instance, the
UK supported the EU’s efforts to expand trade concessions for Pakistan due to strategic,
commercial, and cultural reasons. However, some other EU countries that are concerned
of Pakistan accessing the EU’s textile market voiced their opposition, such as Portugal,
and slowed down the negotiations. Similarly, in EU’s negotiations with Singapore, other
EU states’ interests are prioritized over the UK interests. Being a major financial services
market, Singapore is a significant market for UK services exports. However, since
Singapore has zero tariff rates, negotiating just for non-tariff barriers and have an
agreement was not in the interest of other EU countries that would like to protect their
goods (Booth & Howarth, 2012).
Non-trade Costs and Benefits of EU Membership
Since the EU is more than a trade organization, there are non-trade costs and
benefits of membership. One of the most important costs of EU membership is the loss of
national democratic control. Due to the Qualified Majority Vote (QMV) in the EU
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decision-making process, the UK can be outvoted or might have to concede before voting.
Further losses in national political control should be expected because of the increasing
power of the European Parliament and the jurisdiction of the ECJ. The UK is influenced
by the loss of national political control in many areas, but especially in financial
regulations where it has compelling economic interests. Additionally, justice and home
affairs regulations have repercussions on the criminal justice and asylum system of the
UK. Moreover, the EU brings significant regulatory costs to the UK. Particularly social,
employment, health, and safety regulations of the EU, such as the Working Time
Directive (WTD) and the Agency Workers Directive (AWD) bring cost burden to UK
businesses and to the public sector (Booth & Howarth, 2012). According to a study which
analyzes more than 2,300 impact assessments, and published by Open Europe in 2010,
the cost of EU regulations to the UK economy was £124 billion since 1998 (Gaskell &
Persson, 2010).
Having a very different agriculture and farm policy than other member countries,
EU budget contributions have brought significant costs to Britain. The agriculture and
farm policies of the EC countries were very different than the British domestic
agriculture policy. Having access to the cheap food supplies of the Empire or the
Commonwealth, the British agricultural policy was oriented towards cheap prices. On the
contrary, in the original six countries the agriculture policy was producer-oriented
because the share of agriculture in GNP and employment was much higher in the postwar period. As a result, the CAP negatively influenced Britain’s integration. Due to the
bias of CAP towards spending on agriculture, Britain was not financially benefiting from
the budget. Therefore, the British government looked towards changing the budgetary
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system to be able to account for the circumstances of the UK. For the UK, EU budget
contributions are expected to remain around £14bn mostly due to CAP and EU regional
policy reform. Besides regulating all the waters of the member states, Common Fisheries
Policy has been negatively influencing the fisheries and the fishermen in the UK (Booth
& Howarth, 2012; Bulmer, 1992).
Through the European Political Co-operation British foreign policy benefited
from the European integration in two ways. In 1970s Britain realized that its channels to
play a world role became very limited. Neither its special relationships with the US nor
its traditional connections with the Commonwealth was reliable for British foreign policy
anymore. In that era, the European Political Co-operation (EPC) provided a third
alternative for the British foreign policy. Additionally, being a part of the EPC, Britain
was able to use the developing West European foreign and defense policy in 1990s as a
channel (Bulmer, 1992).
The main non-trade benefit of EU membership for the UK is to be able to affect
political and economic events in Europe. Being a member, the UK was able to champion
the development of the Single Market in goods, and now it is pushing for the
liberalization of the services. Furthermore, EU membership allowed the UK to support
the enlargement of the union to the East, and the UK will be a part of the decision making
for the future enlargements. Additionally, by contributing to the EU foreign policy as a
major military power, the UK has the ability to play a role in Europe’s global relations
(Booth & Howarth, 2012).
If Britain leaves the EU, it would lose its diplomatic and military sway. A Britain
which is detached from the Europe would be a less valuable ally to the US because of
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losing its functionality. Moreover, a Britain that is disengaged from the rest of Europe
would erode the continental ties in NATO. These ties are already under tension due to the
decreased defense budgets and the “rebalancing” strategy of the US against Asia
(“Britain and Europe: Making the Break,” 2012; Wheeler & Peter, 2013).
Another issue that would affect Britain negatively is the reallocation or
repatriation of people. Leaving the EU means that there is going to be barriers against the
free movement of labor. However, in 2011 there were 2.3 million people living in Britain
from other EU countries and 1.7 million British people in other EU countries. The
residential rights of these migrants would be a problem if Britain leaves the EU. In case
of a forced repatriation all countries would suffer. Once the walls of the borders are risen
up, the businesses would be harmed. For instance, London’s expanding tech industry and
the City benefit highly from the flow of young workers coming from the other EU
countries (“Britain and Europe: Making the Break,” 2012).
UK’s Importance to the EC
EC and EPC have played significant roles in British policy, however, Britain’s
role in the European integration was very limited. First, Britain was not one of the six
which initiated the European integration. The integration progressed two decades without
British involvement. Second, the disagreements of Britain in the EC, such as the
budgetary contribution and the CAP created doubts in other member countries about
Britain’s commitment. Moreover, Britain blocked the attempts to strengthen the
supranational institutions of the EC, like establishing a uniform electoral system for the
European parliament. Britain was reluctant to participate in some policy areas, and the
European Monetary System was the most well known among them. European initiatives
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have often been from the Franco-German core or the European Council but not from the
commission. In other words, governmental initiatives have hardly ever come from the
British government (Bulmer, 1992).
The contribution of Britain to the European integration was only in two specific
areas. First, Britain’s diplomatic resources, such as its connections with the US and the
Commonwealth, helped the development of political cooperation significantly in the EPC.
British contribution can be seen in the European integration is and related to the
liberalization and deregulation of the internal market. In this regard, during the British
presidency of the Council of Ministers in 1981, the service sectors were brought into
attention. The Thatcher government advocated the measures to include the service sectors
in the internal market (Bulmer, 1992).
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Analysis
In this section, by using a conflict-cooperation analysis under Power Transitions
perspective, an empirical assessment will be made to understand the influence of the UK
on the European integration process. Analyzing the relationship between relative power,
hierarchies and the level of satisfaction, Power Transitions measures conflict and
cooperation.
As the first step of the conflict-cooperation analysis, it is significant to understand
the hierarchy of the European Union. Power Transitions teaches us that the influence of
every nation in the international system is not constant. Some nations in the international
system exert more influence to the status quo than others. Related to their level of power,
countries become more capable in influencing the global or regional status quo. Countries’
level of economic, political, military, demographic and technological capabilities
compose their level of power. In the European hierarchy, level of power will be
accounted by the measurements of GDP purchasing power parity (PPP), the population
and Composite Index of National Capability Score. Composite Index of National
Capability Score is the sum of six capability components, which are total population,
urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military personnel, and
military expenditure (Singer, 1987).
The UK is among the great powers of European hierarchy. Using three
measurements of power, GDP, population and Composite Index of National Capability
Score, Graph X depicts the hierarchy of the European Union. While Y-axis indicates the
level of GDP and X-axis shows population, the size of the bubbles demonstrate the
Composite Index of National Capability. According to Graph X, Germany is clearly the
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regional leader. Though the UK has the second highest GDP in the Union, France and
Italy are close to the UK. Therefore, the UK, France, and Italy can be identified as great
powers. Due to their economic, demographic, and military capabilities, Spain, Poland,
Austria, Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden can be identified as middle powers. Due to
the number and variety of members, it is not figurative to show all 27 members of the
Union in one graph. For simplicity, Graph X depicts the member countries whose GDP
level is higher than $600 billion. The rest of the member countries’ level of GDP vary
from $253 billion to $10 billion, and can be categorized as small powers. In terms of their
level of power, from the highest GDP to the lowest, small powers of the EU are as
follows: Czech Republic, Greece, Romania, Portugal, Denmark, Finland, Hungary,
Ireland, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Slovenia, Luxemburg, Latvia, Estonia, Cyprus,
and Malta.
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Graph X: Hierarchy of European nations
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The second step in the analysis is to evaluate the level of satisfaction in the status
quo. Britain’s level of satisfaction reflects similar policies and preferences it has with
other members of the Union. Consequently, the level of satisfaction in this study will be
taken as the satisfaction with the regional status quo, European integration, rather than
the satisfaction with the global status quo. The level of satisfaction is going to be
measured by the following two Eurobarometer (2013) survey questions:
1. And, for each of them, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it?
European Commission
Tend to trust
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Graph XI: The percentage of citizens who ‘tend to trust’ the European Commission
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2. Generally speaking, do you think that (your country's) membership of the
European Community (Common Market) is ...?
A good thing (percentage)
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Graph XII: The percentage of people who thinks their country’s EU membership is ‘a
good thing’
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The level of satisfaction with the EU is lowest with British citizens. The first
question used to measure the level of satisfaction is related to trust. Graph XI depicts the
percentage of people who ‘tend to trust’ the European Commission. For simplicity, only
the major power’s level of satisfaction is illustrated in the graphs. Compared to the other
members, British citizens have the lowest level of trust for the Commission. Similarly,
the replies to the second question depict the dissatisfaction of British citizens. Compared
to the other nations, the percentage of people who think their country’s EU membership
is ‘a good thing’ is the lowest among British people. As a result, both of these survey
questions indicate that Britain has the lowest level of satisfaction in the Union compared
to the other members.
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By combining the hierarchy and the level of satisfaction information, an
assessment of conflict-cooperation can be made. Being one of the great powers of the
hierarchy, the UK is not an ordinary country. In terms of GDP and Composite Index of
National Capability Score, Britain is the second most powerful nation in the Union.
Consequently, the weight of influence of the UK on the European status quo is not going
to be same with countries placed at the lower levels of the hierarchy, such as Poland,
Greece or Latvia. The more relative power a country has in a hierarchy, the more
influential it is in the status quo. As a result, according to Power Transitions, being a
powerful nation in the regional hierarchy, the level of Britain’s dissatisfaction is going to
create conflict on the European integration.
Conflict – Integration Model
This paper aims to measure the impact of Britain’s dissatisfaction on the
European integration. To be able to capture Britain’s impact empirically on the EU, the
following formula, which was proposed by Brian Efird, Jacek Kugler and Gaspare Genna
(2003), will be used:
CI = RP – S (RP3) + HC + HD
CI= Conflict – integration continuum
RP= Relative power
S= Level of satisfaction with the status quo
HC= Hierarchy of the challenger
HD= Hierarchy of the dominant power
The conflict- cooperation model will be modified in this paper to be able to
capture the European regional hierarchy. The original formula was designed to capture
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both military conflicts and cooperation with war and integration at respective extreme
ends. However, analyzing the European integration, the probability of military conflict is
very low. Therefore, this paper focuses only on the cooperation side of the continuum as
it is illustrated in Figure III. Besides differing from the original formulation, this paper
will use the two Eurobarometer survey questions related to trust and membership to
account for the satisfaction with the regional status quo. As a result, the model is
modified to capture the level of conflict even in a high level of integration. The new
model is designed to measure the impact of Britain’s dissatisfaction on the European
integration – towards further integration or just staying at certain level of cooperation as
shown in Figure III.
Figure III: Modified conflict- integration continuum
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Conflict- integration continuum represents a measure starting from 0 to 8. Being
in the middle of the measure, 4 represents neutrality as illustrated in Figure IV. From 4 to
8 the level of conflict with integration increases. For Britain, the highest level of conflict,
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8, can indicate reversing EU integration. On the other side, from 4 to 0 the support for
integration increases. Since 0 is the highest level of cooperation, this end can denote the
highest level of integration: political union (Figure IV).
Figure IV: Conflict - integration continuum
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Relative power is the capacity of one nation to influence another either by
persuasion or by force. The more relatively powerful a nation is, the more capable it is to
impose its preferences on the others in its hierarchy. In this model GDP at purchasing
power parity (with 2005 $) will be used to measure power. Since it is intended to run a
simulation with the model until 2050, GDP data is taken from International Futures
version 6.69. In trying to determine how influential the UK can be against German
leadership, relative power is going to be taken as follows:
RP=

GDPUK
GDPGermany

The closer the level of GDP of the challenger to the dominant power, the less orderliness
there is in that hierarchy. Therefore, the higher the level of UK’s GDP relative to
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Germany’s, the lower the level of orderliness will be in the European hierarchy. This
situation is captured by the formula because an increase in RP will be reflected as an
increase in the conflict-integration score, meaning a higher probability of conflict. When
Germany’s GDP level increases more than the UK’s GDP, RP will start to get smaller
and decrease the probability of conflict on the conflict- integration continuum.
The satisfaction variable represented with ‘S’ in the formula defines whether the
RP will create conflict or not. As it is mentioned before, two Eurobarometer questions
related to ‘trust’ and ‘membership’ are going to be used to account for the level of
satisfaction with the status quo. The survey question data related to ‘trust’ and
‘membership’ are in percentages. To be able to use these data in the conflict- integration
formula, it is rescaled between -1 to 1. As a result, percentages between 50 to 0 are
rescaled between 0 to -1, and percentages between 50 to 100 are rescaled between 0 to -1.
When the level of satisfaction is below 50%, it is going to be transformed into a negative
number representing dissatisfaction between 0 and -1, and due to the negative sign before
the ‘S’ variable in the formula, the dissatisfaction level will cause an increase on the
continuum representing an increase in the level of conflict. If the level of satisfaction is
higher than 50%, rescaling the number will transform it into a positive number between 0
to 1, and due to the negative sign before the ‘S’ variable in the formula, the model will
perceive it as an increasing level of cooperation/ integration.
The data of the question related to ‘trust’ is adjusted to be able to use in the
conflict- integration model. As it can be seen from Graph XI, the data of the question
related to trust between 1999 and 1993 is missing. This missing period is interpolated to
be able to use in the formula. Furthermore, as it can be seen from Graph XI and Graph

63	
  
XII, the data of the first question ‘trust’ does not go back to 1973 like the data of the
second question regarding ‘membership’. Therefore, the ‘trust’ data is extrapolated from
1993 to 1973, which is the date when the UK became a member of the Union.
The trust variable captures the level of satisfaction with the status quo better than
the alliance portfolios. In classic Power Transitions analysis, the similarity of alliance
portfolios have been used to measure the level of satisfaction with the status quo. The
similarity of alliance portfolios is calculated via dyadic relationships. It is inferred that
“dyads with similar portfolios are satisfied with each other’s view of the international
system or dyadic relationship, and those with dissimilar portfolios are regarded as less
satisfied with each other” (Efird, Kugler, & Genna, 2003, p. 297). However, this
measurement comes with two fundamental problems in terms of what this paper assesses.
First, similarity of alliance portfolios does not directly account for the status quo. Second,
dyadic relationship does not capture the behavior or interaction of multiple countries.
Encapsulating multiple countries functioning is significant especially when there is a
certain level of integration between countries. When countries go into integration, the
rules and guidelines of the integration become the status quo. In this situation, to be able
to account satisfaction, one should directly focus on integration instead of dyadic alliance
similarities. Therefore, directly representing the European integration, trust and
membership variables capture the level of satisfaction with the status quo.
The cubed RP term in the formula captures the propensity for conflict in Power
Transitions. If the RP term in the interactive part of the equation was linear, each unit
increase of RP would cause equal increases on the conflict- integration continuum. If RP
was squared, it would not reflect the likelihood of conflict at parity points. Since
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RP=PowerChallenger/PowerDominant, the formula should reflect the probability of conflict
once the relative power of the challenger increases in terms of the dominant power. It is
anticipated that the likelihood of conflict peaks when the challenger and the dominant
power are in parity. For this reason, squaring RP would underemphasize the amount of
conflict. However, cubing RP gives the highest propensity for conflict right after the
challenger passes the parity point with the defender. Additionally, the cubed RP also
reflects the higher probability of cooperation when the asymmetry between the dominant
power and the challenger increases (Efird et al., 2003).
HD and HC reflect the relative power of the dominant power in terms of all the
contenders in the region. The calculations of these variables are as follows:
HD =

PowerRe gional/Do min ant

! Power

Re gional/Contenders

HC =

! Power

Re gional/Contenders

PowerRe gional/Do min ant

When the power of the dominant country decreases compared to the contenders in the
hierarchy, the total of HC and HD increases to reflect the increasing propensity for conflict.
When the powers of the contenders increase compared to the dominant power, HC’s
increase will be more than HD’s decrease to reflect higher propensity for conflict. The
model will first take the regional contenders as UK, France, Italy, and then Spain and
Poland will be included as well.
Empirical Results
The results of the conflict- integration model are depicted in Graph XIII by using
two satisfaction data: survey questions related to ‘trust’ and ‘membership’. The lower
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two lines, representing ‘trust’ and ‘membership’, are calculated with the data of Germany,
UK, France and Italy. In the conflict- integration calculation of the lower two lines, the
HC and HD are formulated as follows:
HD =

GDPGermany
GDPUK + GDPFrance + GDPItaly

HC =

GDPUK + GDPFrance + GDPItaly
GDPGermany

The upper two lines, ‘trust+’ and ‘membership+’, that diverges from the bottom two at
1986 are calculated including Spain and Poland in HC and HD. The trends of the lower
two and upper two indicate that ‘trust’ and ‘membership’ data are consistent with each
other.
Graph XIII: UK’s conflict- integration scores
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This conflict- integration calculation does not represent a classis dyadic
relationship. Mathematically in the hierarchy calculation (HC and HD), the variables are
taken as Germany versus the UK, France and Italy, depicted in Graph XIII, and in the
upper two lines it is Germany versus the UK, France, Italy, Spain and Poland. However,
since the satisfaction variables, trust and membership, are measuring Britain’s level of
satisfaction with the EU, the model accounts for the level of conflict between the UK and
the EU. When we say the EU, this can be perceived in several ways: the EU status quo,
the EU integration process, or the major representatives of the EU integration process.
The results empirically depict the conflict due to Britain’s dissatisfaction. As it
can be seen on Graph XIII, according to the data between 1973 and 2012, the probability
of conflict related to the UK’s relationship with the EU runs between 3 and 4. The graph
illustrates that conflict- integration results are not close to 0, meaning the UK had never
supported further integration in its relationship with the EU. One can ask if the
relationship between the UK and the EU is conflicting, why the results of the conflictintegration model are not higher than 4 (neutral). Due to the relative power of the
dominant power, Germany, further increase of the conflict probability had been
prevented. However, as it can be observed from Graph XIII, when Spain and Poland are
added to the formula according to their entrance dates (Spain 1986 & Poland 2004), the
impact of the dominant nation decreases in the hierarchy and the probability of conflict
originated from the UK increases. Therefore, we see a second upper line group with a
jump in the level of conflict in 1986 and another one in 2004. Consequently, the focus of
the analysis will be the trend of the conflict- integration results instead of the area in the
continuum.
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Deepening of integration in the EU creates further dissatisfaction in the UK. As it
can be seen from Graph XIII, the probability of conflict increases after 1993 and 1994.
According to the data, there are two reasons for this situation. First, RP is increasing,
meaning that the power gap between Germany and the UK is decreasing. As Power
Transitions explains, the smaller the power-gap between the dominant nation and the
challenger, the higher the probability of conflict will be. The second reason is the
decreasing level of satisfaction in the UK. Starting from 1991 membership and from 1993
trust variables have been decreasing, which is an indication of rising dissatisfaction.
Power Transitions underscores that decreasing satisfaction increases the propensity of
conflict especially when the relative power of the challenger is increasing. The decrease
in the level of satisfaction starting from 1991-1993 until 2012 (end-year of the data)
might be related to the deepening of integration due to the development of the Economic
and Monetary Union (EMU) and the attempts to have new constitutional structures - the
Amsterdam Summit, Agenda 2000. The level of integration was taken to a higher level
with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the integration process continued onwards with
the stages of the EMU. Because of not sharing the same European vision with the other
members of the Union, joining the EMU and using the euro translates to the British
people as losing sovereignty. Hence, the UK opted out from the third stage of the EMU
and has not introduced the euro. At the period between 2010 and 2012, the probability of
conflict drops a little bit, but this is solely related to the decreasing RP, meaning that the
GDP gap between the UK and Germany increased. As a result, the dissatisfaction of
British citizens had been increasing the probability of conflict between the UK and the
other member countries.
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Using the conflict- integration formulation, it is possible to run simulations to
estimate future probability of conflict. Estimated future country GDPs, available from the
database of International Futures (IFs), can be used in the conflict-integration calculations.
By inserting possible satisfaction levels to the formula for each future year, we can
calculate the future probability of conflict between the UK and the EU. If the possible
satisfaction values from, -1 to 1, are inserted to the calculation for each future year, a
three dimensional map of conflict can be generated as Graph XIV.
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When we run a simulation using the conflict- integration model for the years
between 2013 and 2050, a rising probability of conflict can be observed between the UK
and the EU. According to Graph XIV, if the level of dissatisfaction increases in the UK,
after 2031 the probability of conflict will pass level 5 on the conflict- integration
continuum. Above the middle point 4, the increasing likelihood of conflict is depicted
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with light yellow, which is the highest surface area in Graph XIV. The propensity of
conflict increases due to the relative power (RP) because according to the data of IFs, the
GDP gap between the UK and Germany will decrease, and starting from 2028 they are
going to start running in parity. Starting from the year 2028, relative power between the
UK and Germany is higher than 0.8 (RP > 0.80), meaning that the UK is going to reach
80% of Germany’s GDP level. According to Power Transitions, once the challenger
acquires 80% of the dominant power’s capabilities, the propensity of conflict increases.
The propensity of conflict increases until the challenger procures 20% (RP= 1.20) more
capabilities than the defender, which is not the dominant power anymore.
Being in parity with the dominant nation is a leadership opportunity for the UK.
According to the International Futures dataset, around 2058 Britain’s GDP level will be
equal to Germany’s (RP= 1). With the UK’s current level of satisfaction, this is a sign of
high conflict. On the other hand, if the UK increases its commitment for European
integration, this is a valuable opportunity for Britain to shape the regional status quo. If
the overtaking between the UK and Germany happens without conflict, the UK can build
a strong leadership with the support of Germany and other great powers. Then, it can
shape the status quo. For instance, using this leadership opportunity, the UK can initiate
the inclusion of services sector in the Common Market. However, to be able to lead the
EU, the UK needs to prove its commitment for European integration. Without proving its
European ideals, the UK will not be able to have the support from other member states.
When Spain and Poland are added to the hierarchy calculation in the formula, the
rising propensity of conflict becomes much more visible. As it can be seen from Graph
XV, the light yellow area on the surface is now wider, representing higher propensity of
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conflict. After 2038 we even observe an area over 5 on the conflict- integration
continuum, which can be identified as a ‘high risk’ area. Consequently, if the UK’s level
of dissatisfaction continue to increase, after the year 2038 the likelihood of conflict
between the UK and the other EU members is going to be very high. This rising
propensity of conflict is a serious threat on the European integration process.
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  Forecasting the probability of conflict between the UK and the EU
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EU’s Future Development in the Long Run
By using Power Transitions perspective and the International Futures database, it
is possible for us to forecast the consequences of the UK’s possible departure from the
EU. If the UK decides to leave the EU in 2018 after a referendum, both the UK and the
EU will be affected significantly. The consequences of such a departure are depicted in
Graph XVI. The vertical axis depicts the level of GDP, the horizontal axis the level of
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population, and the sizes of the bubbles represent GDP per capita. According to the
results, from the standpoint of the UK, it is clear that the country would lose its influence
in the international system. Leaving the EU, the UK would end up as a small actor in the
international system, depicted in the lower left corner of the Graph XVI. Compared to the
EU and the US, Britain would have a much lower place in the global hierarchy. In terms
of its level of GDP and population, it would not be possible for the UK to be influential
in the international system. On the other hand, the UK’s departure would also affect the
EU’s level of power. As it can be seen from Graph XVI, if the UK leaves the EU in 2018,
a downward shift is expected from the Union in terms of GDP and population. In the
graph below it can be observed that EU28 (including the new member Croatia) is
underneath the US due to its level of GDP. If the UK leaves the Union, EU28 would drop
to EU28–UK, which presents the EU without Britain. This fall that we observe in Graph
XVI might not change the position of the EU in the global hierarchy; however, this
situation would cause a decrease in the relative power of the EU. For instance, the power
gap between the US and the EU would be much wider.

72	
  
Graph XVI: Forecasting UK’s departure from the EU, 1960 – 2100

Source: International Futures (IFs)

When the future global actors and their potential power are taken into account, it
becomes clear how important it is for the UK and the EU to cooperate. According to the
database of International Futures, the US’s level of GDP will be passed by China around
2021 and by India around the year 2042. As it is depicted in Graph XVII, indicators show
that in the future, China and India are going to surpass today’s dominant and great
powers in the global hierarchy. As the timeline analysis between 1960 and 2100 in Graph
XVII depicts, relative power of the US and the EU will become very small compared to
China and India. In such scales of global actors, the UK by itself would only be perceived
as an insignificant speck in the international system. As a result, due to the rising new
global actors from Asia, deeper levels of integration seems as the only option for the
Western countries to survive in the international system.
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Graph XVII: Forecasting EU’s global position, 1960 – 2100

Source: International Futures (IFs)
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Contribution to the Literature & Further Research
For the development of the scientific enterprise, it is significant to understand
where this study fits in literature and what kind of further research opportunities it brings.
The way it defines Britain and how it empirically measures Britain’s impact on EU
integration makes this study an original one. However, this is not sufficient for us. There
is always room for scientific development. For the continuation of this development, we
need to understand the place and contribution of this study in Power Transition literature,
and realize the limitations of our study.
This study contributes to the scholarly enterprise in several ways. There have
been many studies analyzing the relationship between the UK and the EU – defining the
UK as “the awkward partner”. Lacking of a theoretical framework, in most of the studies
regarding this topic, political events are usually presented to the audience in a historical
timeline, and the reasons behind the British understanding of European integration are
portrayed. However, this paper brings a different approach to the British case in
European integration by using Power Transition theory. Instead of analyzing past events
between the UK and Britain, this study analyzes empirical data and estimates future
outcomes of the relationship.
With this paper, for the first time, the conflict- cooperation formula is applied to
an integration model. The calculation is modified to capture the level of conflict in
European integration. Using the ‘trust’ and ‘membership’ variables to capture the level of
satisfaction with the regional status quo is a fairly new concept in Power Transitions
literature. The classical Power Transitions analysis focuses on the global level status quo.
However, with this paper, it is underscored that to be able to have a better regional level
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conflict encapsulation, one should focus on the regional level status quo. This paper is
going to be a strong model indicating that the level of analysis should be consistent with
the case that is being analyzed.
This study proves that when the status quo is framed well, it is easier to measure
the level of satisfaction. In the case of this study, having European integration as the
regional status quo increased the precision of the model, because the concept of European
integration is definite with its rules, guidelines (agreements) and institutions. Therefore,
the perception of European integration is same in every member country. As a result, a
well-defined status quo gives us the ability to better account for the level of satisfaction
and increases the accuracy of our measurement for conflict or cooperation.
A micro-level analysis would complete the assessment of this paper. Conflictcooperation analysis under Power Transitions provides the ability to make only macrolevel analysis. For instance, conflict- integration formulation accounts the impact of other
countries in the hierarchy only when the weight of the dominant power is being measured.
However, the power and the satisfaction levels of France, Italy, Spain and Poland also
determine how much conflict can be inflicted on European integration by the UK.
Unfortunately, the conflict- integration model does not give us the ability to assess the
impact of multiple actors. We cannot really say anything about how the satisfaction levels
of the other great powers in the European hierarchy affect the impact of the UK in the
regional status quo. Maybe the commitment of other member states to European
integration decreases the impact of Britain’s dissatisfaction with the status quo.
Testing the coherence of the Union would contribute to this study. We already
depicted how Britain is a powerful actor in European hierarchy. Powerful actors will
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make the EU stronger. However, we did not test this argument in terms of the coherence
of integration. As it was depicted in Graph XVI, the departure of the UK will cause a
downward shift in EU’s power trendline. However, we do not really know if or how the
departure the UK is going to make the EU weaker. Perhaps coherence will make the
Union a more influential actor in the international arena. Economic tests can be applied to
understand the relationship between economic utility and level of integration. For
example, right now we know that if EU countries do not go through fiscal integration, the
economies of countries in the Monetary Union will be especially at risk. As a result,
analyzing the benefits of EU coherence would provide a better understanding of the
consequences of Britain’s departure.
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Conclusion
The conflict- integration model depicts the impact of Britain’s dissatisfaction in
terms of conflict. The results of the analysis clearly indicate that current state of relations
between the UK and the EU will bring further conflict in the future. The European debt
crisis proved that the current state of integration is not sustainable for the Union.
Therefore, conflict created by one of the great powers of the hierarchy is a serious threat
for the integration process and the future of the Union.
In a scenario of leaving the EU, the UK would become an insignificant actor in
the international system. The empirical results clearly indicate that the UK would lose its
economic and political power in the global system if it departs from the EU. As a single
country, it is not possible for the UK to keep up with the rising Asian powers: China and
India. The deeper the level of integration with the EU, the higher the UK’s level of
influence will be in the international system.
For the EU, the benefit of having a powerful member is smaller than the costs it
brings. If Britain leaves the EU, this would be a serious loss in terms of its level of
capability. However, the debt crisis showed that commitment to the integration is more
important than the level of GDP to sustain the Union as a global actor. The EU has to
avoid any conflict directed to the integration process coming from the members.
Otherwise, the Union would lose its coherence and become a weaker actor in the
international arena. If Britain is going to stay in the EU, it is significant that it has the
European vision for integration. Including Britain into further level of integration without
enough commitment for the Union would jeopardize the integration process. If the UK is
included in further level of integration without enough commitment, the propensity of
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conflict will be higher. To avoid further conflict, a two-tract formulation can be
formulated. Thus Britain and similar countries can take that track, which is a lower level
of integration, until they have the vision for further integration.
The future of both the UK and the EU is bound to their ability to compromise and
cooperate. Realizing its own capacity and the future power transitions in the global arena
should make the UK appreciate its EU membership. On the other hand, the EU should
work for methods that will increase the coherence of the member states. Mechanisms that
will keep the less commitment members apart will save the speed and the development of
the integration process. The highest level of utility in the long run can only come with
higher level of cooperation.
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